

NIO/Irregular Forces

Your role will parallel that of the NIO/Strategic Programs and the NIO/General Purpose Forces. Much of our intelligence effort is directed at the threat represented by Soviet strategic forces and Soviet conventional and power projection capabilities. We now recognize that there may be an equally dangerous threat in the mix of tactics implemented by the Soviet Union in some form of association with or support to Cuba, Vietnam, Libya, Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, and perhaps other nations. This mix of tactics includes destabilization, terrorism, subversion, support of insurgencies, political action, propaganda and other active measures. This irregular activity is heavily targeted at Third World nations, U.S. allies, and relationships between the U.S. and its friends and allies. Your activities will relate

divisions as well as SQVA, the Insurgency Center and other OGI units and geographic offices, in much the same way as NIO/Strategic Programs relates to OSWR, SOVA, SE Division in DO, etc., and NIO/General Purpose Forces relates to OSWR, European Division on Turkey and other NATO countries, EA Division on North Korea, NE Division on Israeli, Arab and Iranian forces, etc.

You will follow the policy activities relating to the Third World, public diplomacy, and economic aspects of instability. Where an irregular threat has a geographic focus, you ought to coordinate your activities carefully with the appropriate geographic office in function and support of its role.

SECRET

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[REDACTED]

You will maintain close liaison with appropriate DDI components which monitor Soviet activities abroad.

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[REDACTED]

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You will represent me in interagency fora in which Soviet active measures or CIA countermeasures are discussed in a policy sense. Operational discussions should be left to the appropriate DDO person.

I look to you to generate a consciousness of Soviet active measures, as well as potential overt responses, in other agencies of government.

Read and analyze Soviet foreign active measures activities with particular emphasis on the overt (e.g., radio, broadcasting, government press organs and other media).

In consultation with appropriate Agency elements, detect at the earliest possible stage Soviet active measure strategic objectives (e.g., the neutron bomb active measures program was a Soviet classic. We might have defended better against it had someone been seized with the problem of early identification of what was developing).

Conduct liaison with other elements of the Executive Branch interested in Soviet active measures campaigns, specifically State, DoD and USIA

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Participate in briefings of selected [] audiences on active measures tactic and strategy.

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You will have a special responsibility for exploiting intelligence on a wide range of activities by the Soviet bloc, Cuba and anti-U.S. radical regimes and groups (e.g., Libya, PL0)--active measures in Soviet parlance--inimical to U.S. interests []

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The types of activities of concern include Soviet bloc influence with European and other foreign political organizations on behalf of Soviet bloc interests in Latin America (especially Central America/Mexico), the Mid-East and elsewhere; strategic weapons and arms control issues; Soviet acquisition of Western technology for military purposes; support for European and other foreign peace groups; various overt and covert Soviet propaganda and political action activities, especially those designed to isolate the U.S. from allies and friendly governments; and similar measures carried out by Cuba and other governments and groups that support Soviet ends.

You will also identify specific ideological, political and institutional vulnerabilities of the Soviet bloc, Cuba and governments/groups which cooperate with them in hostile international activities and will propose themes and methods for using communications/political action to exploit these. Examples

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You will, in cooperation with appropriate intelligence and policy agencies, be responsible for producing intelligence analyses and national estimates on hostile Soviet bloc and Soviet-associated activities and for developing programs to inform governments and foreign publics of their character and intent.